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Abstract
In order to mitigate cascading failure blackout risks in power systems, the
critical components whose failures lead to high blackout risks should be iden-
tified. In this paper, such critical components are identified by the state-
failure network (SF-network) formed by cascading failure chain and loss data,
which can be gathered from either utilities or simulations. The failures along
the chains are recombined in the SF-network, where each failure is allocated
a value that can reveal the blackout risks after their occurrences. Thus, crit-
ical failures can be identified in the SF-network where the failures raise up
blackout risks, and thus the critical components can be found based on their
critical failure risks. The simulation results validate the effectiveness of the
proposed method.
Keywords: State-failure network, critical component identification,
cascading failure, blackout mitigation
1. Introduction
Cascading failures in power systems often give rise to large blackouts
[1, 2], which lead to severe economic losses and serious social impacts. Gen-
erally, a cascade is triggered by one or more initial outages, and followed
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by many subsequent failures. The components, whose failures are closely
related to large blackouts among the subsequent failures, are the system vul-
nerabilities and thus more critical than other components. An efficient way
to decrease blackout risks is to upgrade the critical components, which need
to be identified. To this end, researchers have made many efforts.
Since electric grids can be taken as complex networks, some analytic
methods in graph theory have been used to identify the system vulnerabili-
ties [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. However, the conclusions derived from topological meth-
ods can be inaccurate because they neglect essential electrical characteristics
[6, 7]. On the other hand, the conclusions reflect vulnerabilities only within
intact systems before failure propagations, therefore, they cannot distinguish
critical components under cascading failures [8, 9]. In fact, triggering events
and propagating events have different mechanisms [10]. It still calls for sim-
ulations of the cascading dynamics to analyze the critical components in the
propagation phase.
Many models, such as OPA model [11, 12], Manchester model [13], DC-
SIMSEP model [14], stochastic model [15, 16] and dynamic model [17, 18],
have been proposed to simulate the cascading failures. The simulation re-
sults provide the bases for analyzing the interactions between components
and identifying the critical factors for cascading failure propagations [19, 20].
Such interactions can be revealed by a failure-propagation–based directed
graphs [19], where nodes represent the failures, edges represent relationships
between failures, and edge weights represent relationship strengths. The
interaction model in [20] and influence graph in [21] to identify critical com-
ponents only consider event numbers and cascading sizes as the blackout
severities while blackout losses are neglected. In fact, long propagating fail-
ure sequences may not cause more severe blackouts than short ones. The
cascading failure graph in [9] considers the blackout losses but limits the
cascading to propagate along the most overloaded components, ignoring the
stochasticity in the propagations. Ref. [22] shows a link analysis algorithm
to analyze the importance of the components in a failure-propagation graph.
In this paper, we propose a novel method based on state-failure–network
(SF-network), which is built up by cascading failure chain and loss data, to
identify the critical components in the propagation phase. The data can be
gathered from either utilities or simulations. To form the SF-network, the
states that indicate failed components and failures that probably occur as
subsequent events at the state are combined. Then, values of states and
failures, which can imply the expected final blackout losses, are calculated.
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By identifying the critical failures in the SF-network which can raise up
blackout risks, component criticality indexes can be obtained. Therefore,
components with higher indexes are more urgent to be upgraded for blackout
mitigation.
Unlike the method in [22], SF-network method calls for few assumptions
or parameters. After a plain calculation of the blackout risks of failures,
it is intuitive that the failures with higher risks are more critical. Thus,
countermeasures that can curtail the occurrence probabilities of such failures
can be employed to mitigate blackout risks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the
detailed structure and some characteristics of the SF-network. The identifi-
cation of critical failures and components is illustrated in Section 3. Finally,
Section 4 studies the IEEE 39-bus system and the IEEE RTS-96 system to
validate the proposed method.
2. Structure of the State-Failure Network and Value Calculation
2.1. States and failures of the SF-network
Many failure data can be recorded in real system operations or simula-
tions, in the form of failure chains [9, 21] with associated final losses. Use
nodes to signify the states and directed edges the failures, then an SF-network
can be formed by arranging the states and failures in occurrence sequences.
Let a sequence {f(1), . . . , f(k)} denote a k-failure chain in a n-component
system. Along the chain, k + 1 states can be set as {s0, s1, . . . , sk}. Each
state is denoted as a 0-1 vector, whose dimension equals to n. The vectors
comprise zeros standing for the operating components and ones for the failed
[15].
The subscripts of the vectors, which equal to the failed component num-
bers, define their stages. Thus, a state vector sk, which contains k ones and
n−k zeros, introduces that k components has failed and the state is at stage
k.
Then the failures are combined with associated states in tuples as (s0, f(1)),
(s1, f(2)), . . . , (sk−1, f(k)). Define an ending mark which is denoted as f0
(equals to 0 in this paper), then combine it with the final state in a tuple as
(sk, f0). Hence, the failure chain can be rewritten as a series of state-failure
tuples, and the tuples indicate where the failures are in the SF-network. The
failures join the states and the occurrence of a failure change the system
3
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Figure 1: An example SF-network framework of a 6-component system, with data
{2, 1, 5, 4} → L1 (red color nodes and edges), {4, 2, 5, 1, 3}→L2, {1, 2} → L3, {4}→L4,
{4, 2, 5}→L5, {4, 2, 5, 6}→L6 and {4, 2, 1}→L7.
from a state to the next. Consequently, the historical propagation paths of
cascading failures can be included.
Say there is a failure chain {2, 1, 5, 4} gathered from a 6-component sys-
tem, which can be rewritten as (s0, 2), (s1(1), 1), (s2(1), 5) and (s3(1), 4) and
(s4(1), 0). This chain as well as another 6 chains forms an SF-network in Fig.
1, where the symbol sk(j) means the jth state vector at stage k.
The loss L is joined to the end of a chain as its result, like {f(1), . . . , f(k)} →
L. In the SF-network, losses are coupled with the state-failure tuples con-
taining f0, which are signified by the dashed directed edges in Fig. 1.
Here we assume that cascading failures are Markovian [15, 16, 21], so
the failures in SF-network only depend on the current system states. The
value calculation and more characteristics based on this assumption will be
discussed in Section 2.2.
Then three terms for the SF-network are explained below:
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1) Probable failures at a state
Say a state sk(j), then there can be many state-failure tuples containing
sk(j). The failures in the tuples are thus the probable failures at sk(j), and
they are collectively originating from sk(j) in the SF-network. Particularly,
an SF-network always originates from the initial state s0. Hence, the failures
at s0 are the probable N-1 events.
Note that the failures of the same component may occur at different
states, they can be distinguished by state-failure tuples, such as (s0, 1),
(s1(1), 1) and (s2(2), 1) showing the failures of component 1 at states s0, s1(1)
and s2(2) respectively in Fig. 1.
2) Prior states and failures of a state
Say Ss,sk(j) be the set of states at stage k − 1 which are linked to state
sk(j), then the states s
k(j)
(i) ∈ Ss,sk(j) are taken as the prior states of sk(j).
Each s
k(j)
(i) is linked to sk(j) by associated failures f
k(j)
(i) ∈ Sf,sk(j), where f
k(j)
(i)
are taken as the prior failures of sk(j) and Sf,sk(j) is the set of prior failures.
In Fig. 1, for example, s1(1) and s1(2) are the prior states of s2(1), and
failures of components 1 and 2 are the prior failures of s2(1) .
3) Types of the states
There are three types of states: terminal state with only f0 where a
cascade definitely ends, passing state without f0 where a cascade definitely
propagates to the next stage, and hybrid state with actual failures and f0
where a cascade can end or pass. The terminal, passing and hybrid states
are surrounded by green, orange and blue dashed circles respectively in Fig.
1.
2.2. Values of states and failures in the SF-network
In addition to the forming process above, loss data are used to calculate
the values of states and failures in the SF-network.
Here we define the calculation rules, where the state values and failure
values are worked out from the last to the first stage. For simplicity, the state
values and failure values are abbreviated by S-values and F-values hereafter.
Assume that the F-values of the failures fm at a state sk(j) are known,
where the subscript m represents the mth component in the system. Let
Ssk(j) be the set of the probable failures at sk(j). Since the occurrences of the
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failures are Markovian, the S-value of the state is obtained by
S(sk(j)) =
∑
fm∈Ssk(j)
N(sk(j),fm)
Nsk(j)
F (sk(j), fm)
=
∑
fm∈Ssk(j)
p(fm|sk(j))F (sk(j), fm),
(1)
where Nsk(j) and N(sk(j),fm) are the occurrence counts of the state and failure
according to the data, and
Nsk(j) =
∑
fm∈Ssk(j)
N(sk(j),fm). (2)
Thus, p(fm|sk(j)) is the conditional probability of fm at sk(j).
The F-values in (1) are derived from two aspects. For the state-failure tu-
ples containing f0 where the losses are firstly introduced into the SF-network,
their F-values equal to the losses
F (sk(j), f0) = L, f0 ∈ Ssk(j) . (3)
For the other tuples whose failures head for states at the next stage, their
F-values equal to the S-values of the states
F (sk(j), fm) = S(sk+1(j′)), fm ∈ Ssk(j) , (4)
where sk(j) and fm are prior states and failures of sk+1(j′).
Therefore, though ending marks f0 are not actual failures that are recorded
in failure chains, they introduce the losses into the SF-network and play the
same role like actual failures in (1), (3) and (4), and thus can be seen as
fake failures. Fig. 2 briefly depicts the relationships between the values of
states and failures, which shows the upstream transmission characteristic of
the value calculation.
Before the calculations, all values of the states and failures in an SF-
network are unknown except for those of the fake failures. So, the calculations
start at the terminal state at the last stage based on (3), and the S-value of
the terminal state equals to the only F-value. Then all the prior failures of
the terminal states get their F-values based on (4). Continue calculating at
prior states with multiple failures based on (1) until to the first stage, then
all values of the SF-network are worked out.
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Figure 2: The calculation relationships of the S-values and F-values. The black part is
the SF-network structure, and the blue part is the calculation flow charts. Obviously, the
value calculation can be regarded as a upstream transmission process, where losses are
transmitted from the terminal states to prior states.
After the calculations, each state and failure gets a value. As shown in
Fig. 2, the S-values of terminal states are the loss averages of the failure
chains that end here. Therefore, the F-values of prior failures indicate the
expected final losses after their occurrences, although it is unknown whether
intermediate loss appears after this failure occurs. Thus, the products of
these values and the probabilities are equivalent to the blackout risks [23].
In other words, the F-values times the conditional probabilities indicate the
final blackout risks of the failure at a state. Then, the S-value quantifies the
blackout risk of the system at the state according to (1).
2.3. Conservation of values of failure cutsets
Denote failures that cut the SF-network into separate networks as a failure
cutset, the failures that head into the cutset as inward-heading failures, and
the failures that head outside as outward-heading failures, as the cutsets in
Fig. 3. Then the value calculation in SF-network manifests the conservation
of values of failure cutsets.
Firstly, from (1) we can get
Nsk(j)S(sk(j)) =
∑
fm∈Ssk(j)
N(sk(j),fm)F (sk(j), fm), (5)
which means that S-value of the state sk(j) times its occurrence count equals
to the sum of F-values of probable failures times occurrence counts. Let
“value sum” be short for the sum of values times occurrence counts. Then,
7
stage k
cutset 1
cutset 3
cutset 2
stage k-mstage 0 …
…
…
…
s
0
S(s
0
)
stage k+n
Figure 3: The dashed curves are failure cutsets in the SF-network. Nodes are states and
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similar to (2), it is easy to know that total occurrence count of the prior
failures of sk(j) equals to Nsk(j) . Thus, given that each F-value of prior
failures equals to the S-value based on (4), the equation between value sum
of state and its prior failures can also be derived from
Nsk(j)S(sk(j)) =
∑
f
k(j)
(i)
∈Sf,sk(j)
N
(s
k(j)
(i)
,f
k(j)
(i)
)
F (s
k(j)
(i) , f
k(j)
(i) ). (6)
Assume a cutset surrounds a single state like cutset 1 in Fig. 3, then the
outward-heading failures are the probable failures and the inward-heading
ones are the prior failures. Hence, value sum of inward-heading failures
equals to that of outward-heading failures base on (5) and (6).
Generally, a cutset can surround multiple states. If it excludes the initial
state s0, such as cutset 2 in Fig. 3, which is actually a union set of the cutsets
surrounding the inner single states. The value sum equation also holds for
the failures in these failure cutsets, which is
Ecutset =
∑
N(·,fin)F (·, fin)
−
(∑
N(·,fout)F (·, fout) +
∑
N(·,f0)F (·, f0)
)
=Ein −Eout = 0,
(7)
where Ecutset is the value sum of the failures in a cutset, and fin/out denotes
the inward/outward-heading failures. The fake failures may not be in the
cutset, their value sum is counted in the Eout part. Thus, (7) reveals the
conservation of values in cutsets that surround multiple states without the
initial state. Note that the states surrounded by a cutset are not necessarily
connected.
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Now, to further expand (7), the S-value item of s0 needs to be added to
(7) when a failure cutset surrounds initial state s0, Thus, we obtain
Ecutset = NS(s0) + Ein − Eout = 0, (8)
where N is the total number of the failure chains. Then for the cutset without
inward-heading failures, such as cutset 3 in Fig. 3, Ein = 0 in (8). Thus, (8)
shows the value conservation in failure cutsets in an SF-network, where the
value sums of any failure cutset equal to 0.
As a special case, when the cutset is so large that all failures are sur-
rounded by the cutset, (8) becomes
Ecutset = NS(s0)−
∑
N(·,f0)F (·, f0) = 0, (9)
which says that the S-value sum of s0 equals to the sum of all losses, and
indicates that the value upstream transmission calculations through the SF-
network are lossless.
3. Identify Critical Components with the SF-Network
3.1. Identify the critical failures in the SF-network
According to Section 2.2, the S-value quantifies the blackout risk of the
system at a state, and the F-value indicates the blackout risk after a fail-
ure occurs. Thus, in a complete SF-network formed by sufficient data, the
failures whose F-values are higher than the S-values of associated states are
worth more attention, because their occurrences can increase system black-
out risks. Therefore, we call such failures critical failures in the SF-network,
and identify them by the process as shown in Fig. 4.
Firstly, exclude the non-critical failures based on the structural features
of the SF-network in step 1. There are single failures at some states, as the
red part in Fig. 4(a), which can be seen as the results of prior failures. Thus,
the forked structures in the SF-network are remained.
Because the occurrence mechanisms differ between initiating events, which
are mainly caused by outer factors including lightning stroke and tree con-
tacts, and subsequent events, which are the system responses caused by over-
current relays or operator orders [10, 21]. Here in this paper, we focus on
the critical subsequent events in the propagation phase, and the initiating
events, which are colored in green in Fig. 4(a), are not considered.
9
fd
e
as0
s
0
(a, f
a(1)
)
(c, f
c(1)
)
(b, f
b(2) )
(a, f
a(2)
)
(c, f
c(2)
)
(b, f
b(3)
)
(b, f
b(1)
)
b c
a
b c
d
e
f
g
h i
g
h i
f
d
e
s
0
(a, f
a(1)
)
(c, f
c(1)
)
(b, f
b(2) )
(a, f
a(2)
)
(c, f
c(2)
)
(b, f
b(3)
)
(b, f
b(1)
)
a
b c
g
h i
step 1
step 2
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 4: Illustration of identifying the critical failures in the SF-network.
Then, among the multiple failures, the failures whose F-values are no
more than the S-values of the states are excluded in step 2. Assume the bold
part in Fig. 4(b) are the failures whose F-values are higher than the S-values,
then they are the identified critical failures, as the failures in tuples (a, fa(2)),
(b, fb(1)), (b, fb(3)) and (c, fc(2)) in Fig. 4(c).
3.2. Critical failure risk and identify the critical components
The identified failures are critical at their own states, to evaluate and
compare the risks of failures at different states and stages, the nonconditional
probabilities need to be worked out.
Let Nk be the times that stage k is reached. Then the nonconditional
probability of a failure can be derived from
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p(sk(j), fm) =
Nk
N
Nsk(j)
Nk
p(fm|sk(j))
=
N(sk(j),fm)
N
.
(10)
Thus, given that F-values are the expected losses of failures as illustrated in
Section 2.2, the risk of a failure at any state can be expressed by
R(sk(j), fm) = p(sk(j), fm)F (sk(j), fm)
=
N(sk(j) ,fm)
N
F (sk(j), fm).
(11)
Therefore, after the items in (8) and (9) are divided by N , the value conser-
vation turns into the risk conservation of failure cutsets.
Sum up the critical failure risks of a component, the component criticality
index (CCI) can be obtained from
Rm =
∞∑
k=k0
Nk∑
j=1
N(s∗
k(j)
,f∗m)
N
F (s∗k(j), f
∗
m), (12)
where k0 is the stage right after initiating events, and the asterisk means that
the variables are the identified critical failures in the SF-network. Note that
Rm is not strictly equivalent to component failure risks due to that some non-
critical failures are excluded in (12). Therefore, CCI is an assessing index for
component criticality, and the components with higher CCI are more critical.
With a complete SF-network where critical failures can be accurately
identified, the component criticality results are reliable. However, it is im-
practical to gather all failure chains, and thus impossible to achieve thorough
completeness of the SF-network. The failures that are too rare to affect the
risk assessments can be neglected, that is, gathering a majority of cascading
failures can lead to reliable criticality analyses. As failure chain data are
read in and the SF-network is evolving, if CCIs become stable enough (the
changes of CCIs converge), the failure chain data will be sufficient to identify
critical components by the SF-network.
4. Simulation Results
4.1. Cascading failure simulator
Among the cascading failure models, the static models are the most pop-
ular due to their computational efficiency and reliable analytical results. Al-
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though the cascading failure processes are complicated, the transmission out-
ages are the dominant forces in the propagation phase. Thus, static models,
such as OPA model, are capable to simulate the behaviours of the transmis-
sion network in the cascading failure through the load redistribution mecha-
nism. Here we design a DC power flow based simulator to produce necessary
cascading failure chains and validate the method, and the components in this
paper are branches. The procedures are as below:
Step 1: Input the power system initial operation point.
Step 2: Set initiating contingency to trigger a cascading failure.
Step 3: Detect islands. Rebalance the generation and loads by generator
rampings with participation factors in each islands. Trip genera-
tors or shed loads when generator rampings cannot cover the power
mismatch [14, 24]. Go to step 4.
Step 4: Calculate DC power flow and check whether any load flow of branches
exceeds its capacity Fi,c. If yes, go to step 5, if not, go to step 6.
Step 5: Select a branch to trip based on the probability model [25, 22] below
and append this failure to the failure chain
pi,trip =


1 , Fi ≥ Fi,max
Fi−Fi,c
Fi,max−Fi,c
, Fi,c < Fi < Fi,max
0 , Fi ≤ Fi,c
, (13)
where Fi,max is the capacity limit of ith branch. When multiple
branches are probable to outage derived from (13), randomly select
a branch among them to trip [9, 16]. If line tripping happens, go to
step 3. Otherwise, go to step 6.
Step 6: The cascade ends. Record the cascading failure chain, and count the
blackout loss as the result of the failure chain.
4.2. IEEE 39-bus system
The system data can be accessed from [26]. It has 46 branches and
6254.23MW load. Fi,max = 1.4Fi,c. Load losses are taken as the losses in
the SF-network and the values are normalized and divided by the total load
amount. Random N-2 contingencies are chosen to trigger cascading failures.
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As the failure chains form the SF-network, the CCIs are recorded as
shown in Fig. 5. Apparently, the CCIs level after about 15000 chains (right
side of the red dashed line) and reach convergence. We calculate the CCIs
in the SF-network formed by the 15000 failure chains. The complementary
cumulative distribution (CCD) of the CCIs are given in Fig. 6. As seen
in the loglog plot, the CCIs show a power-law distribution, which indicates
that only a small part of the branches are much more critical than others.
Qualitatively similar results of the component criticality distributions have
also been obtained in [9, 20, 21].
The identification results are validated by branch capacity expansion [21,
22, 27], which can be accomplished by reconducting or by adding parallel
transmission corridors in real-life systems [21]. The expansion can be easily
modeled as {
F ′i,c = Fi,c +∆F
F ′i,max = Fi,max +∆F
, (14)
where ∆F is the expansion capacity. Branches with expanded capacities tend
to fail less frequently, which alleviates the cascading propagations. Thus,
upgrading the branches with higher CCIs should result in more effective
blackout risk mitigation. Here the capacities of the branches in each group
are expanded by 500MW.
After listing the branches in the descending order of their CCIs, we select
3 groups of branches and each group comprise 5 branches (10% of the total
46 branches). As shown in Table 1, the top 5 branches rank from 1st to
5th, the middle from 18th to 24th and the last from 33rd to 37th. There are
9 out of 46 branches which do not fail in the cascading propagation phase,
thus only 37 branches are included in the full list. The systems with different
upgraded branches are simulated, and the blackout risk results are obtained
and shown in Fig. 7.
It is obvious that branch upgrade can decrease the blackout risks, which
are decreased from 447.8MW to 162.99MW, 410.77MW and 428.74MW by
upgrading the top, middle and last ranking branches respectively. And up-
grading the top ranking, i.e., the most critical, branches shows the largest
risk decrease among the three groups, which validates the effectiveness of the
proposed method. In addition, upgrading the top ranking 5 branches can
substantially decrease the risks of large blackouts (load losses higher than
20%), while the small blackouts are scarcely affected.
Besides, we compare the results obtained from the proposed SF-network
13
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Figure 5: The convergence of the CCIs of the IEEE 39-bus system.
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Figure 6: The CCD of the CCIs of the IEEE 39-bus system.
method (SF) with the identification results from extended betweenness (EB)
method [28] and cascading failure graph (CFG) method [9]. Table 2 gives
the top ranking 5 branches of the results. Only the most critical branch
(branch 3(2-3)) identified by SF is also contained in the EB identification
result, while other branches are different. Fig. 8 shows that the blackout
risks of systems decrease from 447.8MW to 162.99MW by SF identification
results, to 245.28MW by EB identification results and to 387.55MW by CFG
identification results. It is observed that upgrading the critical branches
identified by SF-network can decrease blackout risks more significantly than
those by EB and CFG methods.
4.3. IEEE RTS-96 system
The SF-network method is also validated by the case study on the IEEE
RTS-96 system, whose data can be found in [29]. It has 120 branches and
8550MW load. The loads are increased by 60% to increase the operation
stress. The initial operation point is determined by optimal power flow cal-
culation. And similar to the IEEE 39-bus system, Fi,max = 1.4Fi,c. Load
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Table 1: CCIs of the IEEE 39-bus system (×10−1)
Top 5 branches Middle 5 branches Last 5 branches
Branch CCI Branch CCI Branch CCI
3(2-3) 1.019 22(12-13) 0.056 11(5-8) 0.876×10−2
42(26-27) 0.624 25(15-16) 0.055 15(7-8) 0.861×10−2
38(23-24) 0.503 30(17-18) 0.054 36(22-23) 0.651×10−2
13(6-11) 0.409 21(12-11) 0.050 45(28-29) 0.124×10−2
8(4-5) 0.333 24(14-15) 0.046 44(26-29) 0.077×10−2
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Figure 7: The blackout risks with different branches upgraded of the IEEE 39-bus system.
losses are taken as the losses in the SF-network and the values are normal-
ized and divided by the total load amount. random N-2 contingencies are
chosen to trigger cascading failures.
As the failure chains form the SF-network, the CCIs are recorded as shown
in Fig. 9, where CCIs level after about 55000 chains. Thus, we use the CCIs
derived from the SF-network formed by the 55000 chains, and the CCD of
the CCIs shown in Fig. 10 also show a power-law distribution.
Similarly, select three groups of branches according to their CCI values
Table 2: Critical branches of the IEEE 39-bus system identified by different methods
Rank SF EB CFG
1 3(2-3) 26(16-17) 27(17-27)
2 42(26-27) 25(15-16) 20(10-32)
3 38(23-24) 3(2-3) 37(22-35)
4 13(6-11) 27(16-19) 46(29-38)
5 8(4-5) 31(17-27) 5(2-30)
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Figure 8: The blackout risks after upgrading the critical branches identified by SF-network
(SF), extended betweenness (EB) and cascading failure graph (CFG) of the IEEE 39-bus
system.
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Figure 9: The convergence of the CCIs of the IEEE RTS-96 system.
to validate the identification results, as given in Table 3. Here each group
comprises 12 branches (10% of the total 120 branches). The top 12 branches
rank from 1st to 12th, the middle from 27th to 38th and the last from 97th
to 108th. There are 12 out of 120 branches which do not fail in the cascading
propagation phase, thus only 108 branches are included in the full list. To
upgrade the branches, their capacities are also expanded by 500MW. Then,
the systems with different upgraded branches are simulated, and the blackout
risk results are shown in Fig. 11.
As shown in Fig. 11, blackout risks decrease from 467.10MW to 15.56MW,
403.28MW and 455.55MW by upgrading top ranking, middle ranking and
last ranking 12 branches respectively. Among them, upgrading the top rank-
ing branches eliminates the majority of cascading failures and only small
blackouts may occur. While upgrading the middle ranking and last ranking
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Figure 10: The CCD of the CCIs of the IEEE RTS-96 system.
Table 3: CCIs of the IEEE RTS-96 system (×10−1)
Top 12 branches Middle 12 branches Last 12 branches
Branch CCI Branch CCI Branch CCI
44(201-205) 0.240 85(303-309) 0.022 9(105-110) 0.186×10−3
3(101-105) 0.219 51(206-210) 0.021 77(220-223) 0.182×10−3
82(301-305) 0.204 6(103-109) 0.021 28(115-121) 0.179×10−3
11(107-108) 0.197 10(106-110) 0.020 88(305-310) 0.114×10−3
90(307-308) 0.153 89(306-310) 0.019 66(215-221) 0.100×10−3
52(207-208) 0.150 64(214-216) 0.013 104(315-321) 0.094×10−3
40(121-122) 0.103 102(314-316) 0.012 111(318-321) 0.053×10−3
46(202-206) 0.086 25(114-116) 0.010 112(318-321) 0.053×10−3
117(321-322) 0.085 13(108-109) 0.007 78(220-223) 0.041×10−3
5(102-106) 0.080 91(308-309) 0.007 20(111-114) 0.024×10−3
83(302-304) 0.074 53(208-209) 0.007 113(319-320) 0.021×10−3
79(221-222) 0.074 18(110-112) 0.006 60(211-214) 0.010×10−3
branches can achieve very limited blackout risk mitigation effectiveness.
Then, the identification results by the proposed method are also compared
with those by EB method. The critical branches identified by the both
methods are given in Table 4, and the blackout risk contrasts are given in
Fig. 12. It can be seen that the proposed method shows better effectiveness
in critical components identifications than EB method.
5. Conclusions
This paper proposes a SF-network method to identify the critical compo-
nents in cascading failures. The SF-network is formed by cascading failure
chains that contains the causal relationships between component failures, and
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Figure 11: The blackout risks with different branches upgraded of the IEEE RTS-96
system.
Table 4: Critical branches of the IEEE RTS-96 system identified by different methods
Rank SF EB
1 44(201-205) 119(318-223)
2 3(101-105) 118(325-121)
3 82(301-305) 120(323-325)
4 11(107-108) 70(216-219)
5 90(307-308) 31(116-119)
6 52(207-208) 65(215-216)
7 40(121-122) 26(115-116)
8 46(202-206) 108(316-319)
9 117(321-322) 24(113-215)
10 5(102-106) 107(316-317)
11 83(302-304) 41(123-217)
12 79(221-222) 69(216-217)
losses that measure the blackout severities. It can be used to identify the crit-
ical failures and critical components in the propagation phase of cascading
failures.
The validations verify that upgrading the components with higher criti-
cality indexes can decrease more blackout risks. Thus, the proposed method
can contribute to power system reinforcements and expansion plans.
The criticality indexes of the components are obtained by failure risks, so
relationships between component failures and blackout losses can be further
analyzed in the future. Besides, since the number of failure chains needed
increases as the system scale gets larger, the methods to accelerate the sim-
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Figure 12: The blackout risks after upgrading the critical branches identified by SF-
network (SF) and extended betweenness (EB) of the IEEE RTS-96 system.
ulation can be employed to improve the analytical efficiency of this method,
which is promising and currently being pursued.
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